Abstract
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of literature argues that intergovernmental grants in fiscal federalism tend to be allocated according to political interests (Khemani, 2007: 465) .
Public agents face significant incentives in order to use public investment strategically.
Nevertheless, the disagreement relies on the implemented strategy. A first set of authors have argued that in districted electoral systems, intergovernmental grants will be allocated in those regions in which there are more seats apportioned (Gibson et al., 1999; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Hoover and Pecorino, 2005; Pitlik at al., 2006) . Other authors have posited that intergovernmental grants will be allocated exclusively depending on the presence of the same party in charge of the subnational unit (Khemani, 2003 (Khemani, , 2007 . Finally, another strand of literature has focused on electoral races as the central element driving the levels of government investment, whether it is centered on their own strongholds (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or in breaking a tie in a constituency (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1993; Londregan, 1996, 1998; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) .
Previous studies have been especially focused on the incentives encouraging different strategies. However, there are still important efforts to be made in two analytical vectors. First, political strategies dealing with intergovernmental grants require the interaction of electoral outcomes and institutional context (León-Alfonso, 2007) to be considered together. Second, the subnational level of competition has received less attention in comparison to the national one. The focus has been particularly centered on political affinity among levels of government (Khemani, 2003; 2007) but the role played by regional elections has not been directly addressed. This paper fills that gap.
Spain provides a perfect case study to deal with these challenges. First, it is an evolving federation characterized up to now by periodical bargaining on its fiscal federal framework. The main issue discussed at all times is the amount of total revenues for regions and the criteria to distribute it among those regions. By and large, the main sources of revenues for regional governments are grants (both unconditional and conditional) and tax sharings. Second, Spain is a country with substantial variance in district magnitude across constituencies in national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002) , so it presents a significant within-country change in incentives for resource allocation.
Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling. Despite the theoretical expectations political variables have not been proven especially relevant in some pieces of research (LagoPeñas, 2005; Gómez-Reino y Herrero, 2011) or, at best, there has been mixed evidence in others (Jarocinska, 2006; León-Alfonso, 2007) .
The main contribution of this paper is to integrate the different explanations of intergovernmental transfers in the case of Spain. We focus on two different elements determining resource allocation done by national incumbents: increases of revenues for Autonomous Communities (ACs) or regions as a consequence of periodical bargaining on its financing system, and the most discretional program of earmarked grants: investment agreements made by the central government with subnational entities 1 . In this paper we show that no political variables affect the relative regional gains in the different bargaining process that have taken place. Only in the fourth system regional reform in 2009 was public debt stock positively correlated with the gains in the financing system despite the previous correlation being negative. Hence we show that the mechanism linking debt with higher transfers does not operate automatically and universally.
We also show that in the case of Spain the program of earmarked grants is driven by the electoral interests of the national incumbent, but the preferred strategy is different depending on incentives provided by each level of competition. On the one hand, earmarked grants tend to be allocated in regions where there is a narrow margin of victory in regional elections, back-warding the idea of tactical investment centered on swing regions (Lindbeck and Weibull,1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996) . On the other hand, incumbents tend to devote resources to those regions where they have better results at the national level, especially in those with more seats allocated. Therefore, they follow a "take care of your own" strategy when they focus on the national level (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; León-Alfonso, 2007) . Then, both strategies are followed simultaneously by a political center interested in maximizing its chances of reelection in the national arena and securing as many subnational governments as possible.
1 "Convenios de inversion" in Spanish.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the literature on the political use of intergovernmental transfers and public investment is surveyed. The main hypothesis that has been presented by the literature is discussed and connected with the Spanish case. In section 3 we present the variables used, the specifications and the econometric methodology. The next section summarizes the empirical results and discusses their substantive implications. Section 5 concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A growing body of political economy literature has been centered on how incumbents use intergovernmental transfers for strategic purposes. The central idea of this approach is that political parties and candidates use redistributive policies as an instrument in order to maximize their electoral results, aside from other normative or efficiency considerations. This argument involves two assumptions. First, it assumes that politicians are mainly self-interested rent-seekers and they principally care about (re)-election. Second, it assumes that voters are mainly interested in the private consumption derived from public policies investment. 2 Based on those premises, the literature has investigated the political determinants driving this strategic use of transfers.
The first element that has been addressed is the (un)equal territorial distribution of political representation. According to this argument, Samuels and Snyder (2001) pointed out that policy agenda can be shaped by the level of malapportionment in the electoral system. This bias refers to those situations in which there are a mismatch between the share of legislative seats and the shares of population in a given district or region. When malapportionment is present, the payoffs in terms of representation are altered depending on the region, so politicians will try to take advantage of it. "In malapportioned systems, executives may thus face powerful incentives to build policy coalitions based on the 'cheap' support (for example, in terms of pork per vote) of legislators from overrepresented districts." (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 667 (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383) .
The second model is based on the papers by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and Londregan (1996, 1998) . It assumes that voters cast their ballots considering their ideological preferences and the consumption level promised by parties. According to that, authors distinguished between core voters, with strongly party attachment, and swing voters, indifferent between the parties on policy positions and more likely to switch their votes on the basis of particularistic benefits. Given the different preferences between the two groups, they suggest that incumbents will invest resources in districts until reaching the specific point in which swing voters decide to vote for them. Under some assumptions about the distribution of voters' preferences 3 , this optimal point will be correlated with the closeness of last election (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) . Then, swing states will be the primary target of strategic resource allocation; in those districts where there is higher competitiveness in an electoral contest, the marginal utility of public investment is also higher. Recent evidence has been centered on Swedish intergovernmental transfer programs to municipalities (Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) and has proven the robustness of the hypothesis 4 .
The study by Boex and Martinez-Vázquez (2005) distinguished several explanatory models in order to establish the institutional mechanism of grant allocation.
However, they considered different case studies together and found a high consistency in the role played by political factors driving it. In that which concerns the political allocation of resources, they stressed the voter choice model; the allocation of intergovernmental grants will be distributed to local governments in accordance with the fiscal preferences of the median voter. On the other hand, they also underline the important literature centered on institutional elements, especially regarding the hypothesis that "subnational government with powerful political interests can be expected to receive larger intergovernmental grants" (Boex and Martinez-Vázquez, 2005: 7) . In a similar way, Veiga and Pinho (2005) showed that specific local considerations matters. They proved that the longer the time span of the mayor in office, the more funds are transferred to his/her municipality. They also introduce the relevance of political timing, pointing out that grants increase in election years.
Therefore, interaction between central and subnational has also been pointed out as a crucial variable. Literature has suggested that intergovernmental transfers can be directly related to the incentives that an "opportunistic center" has to guarantee that his party controls the state government. Khemani (2003) studied the case of Indian federalism and she argued that state governments are key bases in order to secure the incumbent party support at the national election; states can use instruments such as patronage in order to boost incumbents´ political support. Consequently "National governments have political incentives to ensure that their party controls state governments, for which purpose it attempts to bias the distribution of national resources to political affiliated states" (Khemani, 2003: 9) . This argument has been proven when Khemani shows that states in India belonging to the same party have higher deficits, entirely financed by loans and transfers from the central government. In posterior research about India, Khemani (2007) proved that intergovernmental transfers are targeted to a particular type of partisan states. In specific, she pointed out that "transfers determined by the political agency are greater to those co-partisan states where the party controls a smaller proportion of districts or seats allotted to the state in the national legislature" (Khemani, 2007: 466) .
Despite the fact that all these factors may affect strategic resource allocation of national incumbents, little effort has been made in order to integrate them together in the same explanatory model. In order to do so, the Spanish case offers a perfect case study to test the strategic allocation of investments and intergovernmental grants for There is a second reason to use Spain as a case study. A number of papers have been centered on how the electoral system can shape incentives towards public spending, the size of the government or the levels of redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Boex and Martínez-Vazquez, 2005; Iversen and Soskice, 2006) . By far, district magnitude has been considered the main element that shapes the electoral revenue that incumbents can obtain when they allocate resources, so the flow of intergovernmental transfers can be affected by those countries in which district magnitude is not a constant across constituencies. This is the case of Spain, a country with important variance in district magnitude across constituencies in national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002) . This within-country difference is relevant to the extent that the marginal utility of intergovernmental transfers is higher in those regions in which a higher number of national seats are allocated when the "take care of their own" strategy is the preferred one. Thus, this hypothesis can only be tested in countries in which there is important variance in district magnitude in the national electoral system like the case of Spain.
Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling and the research dealing with the Autonomous Communities is scarce in general. In Lago-Peñas (2005) this topic is partially addressed in the discussion of regional debt bailout. Some evidence suggests that political affinity helps to explain the size of per capita investment agreements in those regions under the common financing system during the period between 1992-1996 and the relative gains in the financing system in 1991 (not in 1986). Nevertheless, those results should be considered with caution 5 . In the case of investment agreements, Jarocinska (2006) discarded the relevance of political variables on its distribution over the period 1986-1996. However, in the case of direct transfers of the central state managed by the Autonomous Communities, she found that political affinity between regional and national government does not involve more per capita resources.
Nevertheless, it affects voters' loyalty because the percentage of "swing voters" is a relevant explanatory factor.
Leon-Alfonso (2007) provides evidence about the relevance of swing voters and partisan affinity. Her main contribution is centered on pointing out how the relative importance of both components changes with the institutional design. The lower the decentralization is, the more important the role played by partisan affinity and the less important the role played by swing voters. Gomez-Reino and Herrero (2011) 
VARIABLES, DATA, SPECIFICATIONS, AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS
In order to test the systematic influence of the previously mentioned variables on the Autonomous Communities´ resource distribution, we focus on those processes and instruments in which their influence should be strongest. First, we analyze the relative gains involved by periodical bargaining and reforms of the financing of regions, excluding the particular cases of the Basque Country and Navarre. We have set aside the analysis of intra-period variation because granted revenues are mostly driven by exogenous and common cross-region growth rates 6 . Second, we pay attention to the most discretional program of earmarked grants from central administration to regional governments, the so called "investment agreements".
Therefore, two different endogenous variables will be analyzed. First is the gains (GAIN) obtained by each one of the 15 Autonomous Communities under the common regional financing system 7 on the bargaining of the successive systems for the periods 1986-1991, 1992-1996, 2002-2008, and 2009-2013 8 . It is computed as the variation in revenues provided by the regional financing system due to the reform: There are no relevant differences between the national and the regional electoral Third, we introduce in the specification political affinity (AFFINITY) between national and subnational incumbents (Khemani, 2003 (Khemani, , 2007 variable measures the vote share difference between first and second party at the national (regional) level in each region. The higher both variables is the less competitive is the election in this region and, as a consequence, lower intergovernmental transfers and gains of financing system is expected.
3. The last set of political variables focuses on the electoral gain of territories receiving transfers. Figure 1 shows the expected strong correlation between population and seats allocated shares. However, this relationship is not exactly proportional. Less populated regions tend to be over-represented in the Parliament. This fact is graphically represented by a regression line with a slope below the unity (0.86). On the one hand, more populated territories are more relevant in order to secure the national incumbent re-election. But on the other, according to the logic of strategic investment in case of malapportionment, more per capita resources in small territories should be allocated because the vote/seat ratio tend to increase with population size. Therefore, we have introduced two 12 We can include both this variable and individual fixed-effect thanks to the existence of asymmetries in electoral cycles in the different Autonomous Communities. On the contrary, we have to set aside those variables in the case of the equation for GAIN due to the low between-variation across regions. We also tried to define the variable in alternative ways, coding 1 in pre-electoral years and 0 otherwise; and also coding 1 in both electoral and pre-electoral years, and 0 otherwise. Results did not significantly change 13 In the case of the interaction between NATIONAL ELECTION and DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, the latter is not included as independent regressor because its within-variation is close o zero and then multicollinearity with individual fixed-effects was extremely high. However, those variables were scarcely significant, with t-statistics below 1.
Consequently, they were dropped from econometric specifications.
Finally, the debt stock of regional governments (DEBT) is included as
regressor. This inclusion is justified by the literature on bailouts to regional governments 14 . Its core idea is that subcentral governments expecting to be bailed out from financial problems by the central government will opt to carry larger deficits and hence larger debt stocks. A positive and statistically significant coefficient would mean that there are implicit bailouts to those regional governments with more debt. The variable is expressed in thousands of Euros per capita. We have taken the value at the end of the previous year to the implementation of financing system reforms or investment agreements.
[ 
Econometric Specifications and methodology
The following three econometric specifications are estimated: 
RESULTS

15
Performed formal tests backed up the need of introducing both sorts of fixed-effects. Tables 1 and 2 report the main descriptive statistics for the variables in specifications.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE]   Table 3 summarizes the estimates of specification [1] . In the first column none of the variables are statistically significant at the standard levels despite variable DEBT being marginally significant. In order to analyze in more detail the effect of this variable, it is interacted with a set of four dummy variables (T1 to T4) to check for changes in the effect of this variable over time 16 . The results provide interesting evidence. During the eighties, when debt stocks were low, this variable does not matter at all. This situation changes in the ´90s. The variable is marginally significant. In the next decade the effect is statistically significant at a 10% level or lower. What is most surprising is the change in the coefficient sign between the third and fourth reforms. In terms of Spanish GDP, regional public debt was almost the same at the time of both reforms, but the coefficient is negative in the first case and positive in the second 17 .
Why is it that in one period the higher the debt of the autonomous community, the higher the gains received, while in the second period the opposite is true?
[ INSERT TABLE 3 Table 4 ). This means that national incumbents do not "take care of their own" to the same extent in all regions but it is strategically determined by the potential seat gains of each region. The levels of investment will be higher in those regions where the national incumbents have more electoral support in previous election and have more seats at stake.
This evidence points out that hypotheses about the strategic use of investment agreements are complementary; one or the other will be preferred depending on the kind of election. There exist different optimal investment thresholds depending on the electoral contest. In the case of regional elections the optimal level of provision depends on the strategy of maximizing the possibilities of changing a swing region irrespective of the levels of support the national incumbent has. Nevertheless, in national elections the aim is different because the potential threshold of investment is higher. The challenge is not to change swing regions (which do not affect the final result because national constituencies are provinces) but rather to mobilize the national incumbent strongholds as much as possible, especially those regions where more seats are allocated.
The argument of strategic use of intergovernmental transfers is similar to the one by Khemani (2007) when she says that, among co-partisan states, the ones in which it is preferred to invest are those with a lower proportion of seats controlled by the national incumbent. There is a kind of swing state among those owned by the party. However, 21 Insofar as variables REGIONAL ELECTION and NATIONAL ELECTION are correlated (r=0.8), this result could be explained by multicollinearity. However, the first variable was not significant when the second one was dropped either. The interaction between REGIONAL ELECTION and DISTRICT MAGNITUDE was neither significant at 10% level nor lower.
the explanation of our interaction is partially different because in Spain there is an importance variance in district magnitude (Monroe and Rose, 2002) . Therefore, the expected utility of investment will vary depending on the number of seats allocated. If a "take care of your own" strategy is assumed, the expected electoral revenue will be higher, relative to the more seats that Autonomous Community has. This explains the positive sign of the interactive effect.
Finally, POPULATION and SEATS are not statistically significant in column 3 of both Tables 3 and 4 . In the case of the second one the explanation can be related to the misadjustment between the Autonomous Communities and the district in national elections, the province. The SEATS variable considers the share of MPs per capita of the Autonomous Community. However, marginal seats linked with competitiveness (Blais and Lago, 2009 ) and malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder, 2001) should be calculated at the provincial level. Therefore, it is possible that its insignificant effect is driven by this problem, impossible to be solved with available data 22 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Political officials in evolving federations may be tempted to use intergovernmental transfers and grants with strategic purposes. However, there is still an important lack of understanding on the institutional settings driving that behavior and the preferred tactic. In this paper we have addressed two different policies related with territorial resource allocation from the center: the gains of the Spanish regions or Autonomous Communities in the periodical negotiations of their financing system and the most discretional earmarked grants made by the central government to regional governments. This paper tests whether political variables related with electoral contests and their interaction are relevant in explaining their relative assignment across territories. We have shown that gains in the system of financing are unrelated to strategic use. The main factor driving those gains is regional public debt stocks. All in 22 It can be argued that the share of seats by Autonomous Community can distort the results if there are important differences in district magnitude within regions. All in all, the only region where internal variation is really relevant is Catalonia (standard deviation of 12.8 seats compared with the mean of 1.86). Econometric results did not change when Catalonia was dropped to estimate specification [3] .
all the sign and magnitude of its effect depends on more factors, in particular the specific issues discussed in the inter-territorial negotiation.
However, the situation is quite different in the case of intergovernmental transfers. Our argument is that two crucial elements will drive the preferred strategy in terms of their allocation: the arena of competition and the expected marginal gain. In regional contests, the national incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers in order to break a tie in elections and gain the subnational government. Nevertheless, the strategy is different in the case of national elections. In this case, the incumbent will prefer to distribute more money in those regions where it performs better in order to mobilize their voters, especially in those regions in which there are more seats to be won. Then, both strategies are followed simultaneously by a center interested in maximizing its chances in national elections and securing as many subnational governments as possible. Notes: Estimates in columns 1 and 2 include both time and individual fixed-effects and rely on PCSE proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) to compute t-statistics. *, **, *** means statistical sighnificance at 10%, 5% y 1% levels, respectively.
